This paper argues that Michigan can take cost-effective actions to significantly improve the primary state economic development goal: higher per capita income of Michigan's residents.
have the room to make needed economic development investments. I believe this barrier is primarily a political barrier. The solutions to Michigan's structural budget problems are wellknown. The question is whether our political system can adopt these known solutions.
The second barrier is an inadequate state knowledge infrastructure that is dedicated to long-run applied policy analysis, and that has the ear of state policymakers. The state needs the capacity for focusing analytical attention on long-run budget solutions and long-run economic development issues. Developing that capacity will require some small but crucial investments. In addition, state policymakers will have to be willing to pay attention to long-run analysis of state policy issues.
How To Think About State Economic Development
This paper is based on the assumption that the goal of state economic development is to improve state residents' per capita income. There is not space here to extensively argue for this assumption. Growth in per capita income provides broad benefits to state residents' well-being, while growth in overall state economic activity, by itself, may not improve the well-being of state residents. Greater state employment, population or economic output does not provide broad benefits to state residents if per capita income is no higher. Growth is a means to the end of higher state per capita income, not an end in itself. Higher per capita income also is the most reliable way to provide fiscal benefits to state and local governments, as it will increase tax revenues by more than required public service costs. Growth in state economic activity, if unaccompanied by increased per capita income, has more ambiguous effects upon the state and local fiscal situation.
If higher per capita income is the prime goal of state economic development, then it must largely be achieved through higher labor income per capita, as labor income is the majority of income. Higher labor income per capita in turn depends upon some combination of higher employment rates and higher wage rates.
State economic development policy should be viewed as being the same as state labor market policy. The object of state economic development policy is to improve the labor market outcomes of state residents.
Labor market outcomes can be improved by working on the demand or supply side of the labor market. On the labor demand side, we can directly interact with employers to improve the number or quality of jobs they offer to state residents. To target improvements in state labor demand, public policy needs to lower employers' marginal costs of creating more or better jobs.
Such public policies will be most cost-effective when they lower these marginal costs by a large amount compared to the cost of the policy. The costs of the policy include both higher spending and foregone revenue.
On the labor supply side, we can try to improve the employability or job skills of the state's labor supply. Such public policies will be most cost-effective when they improve workers' earnings by a large amount compared to the cost of the policy.
Effective state economic development policy requires finding labor demand policies or labor supply policies with high cost-effectiveness. Such policies will either lower employers' marginal costs or improve workers' skills by a large amount compared to program costs. The effectiveness of such investments can be measured as the increase in the present value of the per capita earnings of state residents, compared to the costs of such investments.
I identify eight promising cost-effective economic development policies in this paper.
Four seek to interact with employers to lower their marginal costs of creating more or better jobs in Michigan. Four interact with Michigan residents to increase their long-run productivity. For each policy, I identify a feasible scale for such a policy that could be pursued immediately. By feasible scale, I mean feasible in the sense that the program could be run productively at that scale. Whether such a scale is politically feasible depends upon securing adequate funding as well. I then provide estimates of the effects of the policy on the present value of the increase in per capita earnings of state residents. Of course, such policies could potentially be scaled up over time to achieve larger benefits.
The concept of focusing on marginal business costs and worker productivity is not original to me. The economic historian Peter Lindert has used this framework to analyze the economic success of Western European countries, in his book Growing Public (2004) . The puzzle is how these countries' economies have succeeded despite high taxes and social spending.
Lindert's answer is that despite high taxes, most Western European countries impose modest taxes on business investment. The marginal cost of additional business investment is not high.
Furthermore, much of the public spending is productive spending. The spending goes for infrastructure that boosts productivity, or investments in education and job training that boost the productivity of workers.
Michigan, like Western Europe, is unlikely to be the lowest tax and wage location in the world. If Michigan is to compete, it will have to figure out cost-effective ways of keeping the marginal costs of business expansion low, while improving the productivity of Michigan's workforce.
The principles of low marginal business costs and cost-effective investments in worker skills may seem obvious. But they frequently are ignored in policy debates. For example, in debates over the business climate, it is common to measure the business climate by the revenue collected by business taxes. But such revenue reflects the average tax rate on business. The average tax rate on business often has little relationship to the additional tax rate paid on business investment. Figure 1 illustrates the lack of relationship between average and marginal business taxes.
On the horizontal axis, I show the average tax rate on business in 20 leading industrial states. Across all 20 states, the correlation between average business tax rates and marginal business tax rates is −0.08. This correlation is statistically insignificantly different from zero.
It is perhaps understandable that lobbies for business interests favor lowering average tax rates for all businesses rather than lowering marginal business tax rates for only those businesses that make extensive new investments. However, policymakers should see lowering marginal business tax rates as being more cost-effective than lowering average business tax rates. It makes a state more attractive for business investment at a lower cost in foregone revenue.
It also is common for political leaders to use rhetoric about improving skills to justify all kinds of educational and other programs. However, it is less common to do hard-headed analysis of exactly how much skills improvement (and associated earnings benefits) will be achieved per dollar of investment in a specific program. It does no good to "invest in skills" unless such investments are productive.
Four Ideas for Boosting Michigan Labor Demand
I now turn to presenting my eight ideas for productive investments that will raise Michigan per capita labor market earnings, either by lowering the marginal costs of business creation of good jobs, or raising skills. The first four ideas focus on boosting labor demand through lowering marginal business costs, although in some cases they also include elements that will boost skills. 2) Given what we know about tax incentives, how can they most effectively be designed?
3) What scale of expanded tax incentive might reasonably be considered in the short-run?
As I have outlined in other research (Bartik 2005) , the effects of business incentives can be estimated using two types of prior research. First, there is the research on how overall state and local business taxes affect business location and growth decisions. This research estimates how a lower stream of tax rates over time affect business location and growth decisions. Under the reasonable assumption that "a dollar is a dollar," the effects of a given tax incentive can be assumed to be the same as a given reduction in overall tax rates with the same present value to the business.
Second, there is the research literature on how state and local employment growth affects employment rates and wage rates. We have good knowledge about what these effects are in the short-run and the long-run.
One important issue in estimating the effects of incentives is how businesses discount future cash flows. Business incentives are generally provided over a shorter time period than the effective life of the investment. Therefore, the time pattern of how business incentives affect business cash flow is not the same as the time pattern of how reductions in overall business tax rates affect cash flow. Calculating the effects of business incentives versus lower business tax rates requires some assumption about business discount rates.
The available research evidence suggests that business decision makers use very high discount rates for future cash flows. The stereotype that business decision makers are focused on short-term profits and stock prices is to some extent true. For example, research by Summers and Poterba (1994) suggests that the median real discount rate (adjusted for inflation) of business decision-makers is 12 percent annually.
We also need some information on how policymakers should discount future cash flows, so that we can evaluate the present value from a public perspective of different streams of benefits and costs at different times. There is a general consensus from the research literature that the appropriate social discount rate that should be used by the public sector is considerably less than a 12 percent real discount rate. In my calculations here and elsewhere, I have used a real social discount rate of 3 percent, which is in the middle of suggested social discount rates.
(See the appendix of Bartik 2008 for a review of different discount rates and why 3 percent is a moderate assumption.)
I use all these assumptions to evaluate the effectiveness of a business incentive program that provides the incentive evenly over a ten year period. 3 A ten year period for a business incentive would not be unusual among state and local business incentives. Based on these assumptions, I calculate the ratio of the present value from a public perspective of the increased per capita earnings of state residents from this incentive program, to the present value from a public perspective of the foregone tax revenue from this incentive program. This "benefit to cost" ratio ends up being 3.14. For each $1 in tax revenue foregone from the incentive, on a present value basis, the incentive program increases the present value of state residents' earnings by $3.14.
However, given the discrepancy between the real discount rates of business decisionmakers and the social discount rate, there is room to improve the cost effectiveness of business incentives by making the incentive more up-front. Intuitively, the incentive provided seven or more years from now is not worth very much to the business decision-maker in affecting business location decisions, given a 12 percent annual discount rate. On the other hand, the incentive provided seven or more years from now should be considered to be significant in cost by public decisionmakers, given the social discount rate of 3 percent.
If the incentive is provided entirely upfront, the benefit to cost ratio increases from 3.14 to 4.47. In other words, per $1 of an incentive provided entirely today, the estimated increase in present value of state residents' earnings is $4.47. This is over 40 percent greater than the benefit-cost ratio from an incentive provided over ten years. during the first two to three years, we avoid problems of having to invoke clawbacks due to modifications of investment and employment decisions after the incentive announcement. This approach also encourages businesses to more quickly implement the location decision. By only having clawbacks when the earnings at the facility are reduced more than some cutoff percentage below the second or third year level, we also reduce the number of cases where clawback agreements must be enforced.
It should be recognized that more upfront incentives may be significantly more costeffective than longer-term incentives. This justifies taking some risk that some business location decisions may not work out long-term, and that in some cases clawback provisions will need to be invoked.
How much in additional business tax incentives might be considered in Michigan? We currently devote the following resources to business tax incentives in Michigan: $245 million in property tax abatements, $117 million in film credits, $111 million in Renaissance zone tax exemptions, $95 million in MEGA tax credits, and $73 million in brownfield tax credits (Executive Budget Appendix on Tax Credits, Deductions, and Exemptions, FY 2009). Other programs could also be considered business tax incentives, for example the $310 million devoted to tax increment financing programs, under which tax revenue in a certain geographic neighborhood is diverted for infrastructure and services in that area. In any event, it is clear that business tax incentives in Michigan exceed $600 million annually. Therefore, I suggest that additional tax incentives of $100 million per year might not be out of the question.
If these additional business tax incentives were provided all up front, they would be estimated to increase the present value of Michigan residents' earnings by $447 million. If the incentives were provided over two or three years, the estimated effects on earnings would be somewhat reduced.
If business tax incentives are so effective, why not just reduce overall business taxes across the board? Cutting average business tax rates has a much higher revenue loss relative to effects on business decision-making, compared to business tax incentives that target marginal business tax costs. For example, simulations indicate that cuts in general business tax cuts would lead to cuts in public spending that would reduce labor demand sufficiently to offset 40 percent of the job creating effects of the general business tax cuts . If these cuts in public spending also reduce public services valued by business, it is quite possible that general business tax cuts would actually reduce jobs in Michigan. In contrast, cuts in marginal business tax costs due to incentives cause far less of a revenue hit for the state. Why might training programs be more effective than tax breaks? In part, it is because training programs are by definition up-front assistance, which is more salient to business location decisions. However, another factor is that training programs can increase worker productivity by considerably more than they cost. Training programs for adults are most effective when they are tied closely to employer needs. The evidence for these statements is considered further below, when I consider proposals for expanding job training programs.
Michigan already has a customized training program for economic development, which It seems feasible for Michigan's customized job training programs to be expanded by at least $30 million per year and still be highly productive programs with plenty of good projects to be funded. If these programs are roughly 10 times as effective in creating jobs and earnings as business tax breaks, then their ratio of their effects on the present value of state residents' earnings, to program costs, will be at least 30 to 1. (As noted above, the ratio for the typical business tax break is 3.14, which implies a ratio for customized job training programs of at least 31.4). This $30 million expansion would then increase the present value of earnings for Michigan residents by $900 million. Jarmin (1998) has done studies comparing productivity growth of assisted with unassisted firms before and after intervention. These studies use techniques such as matching assisted to unassisted firms, or relating the probability of assistance to a firm's distance from the nearest extension center, to make sure what is being estimated is a true effect of the program. Jarmin's analysis suggests that manufacturing extension services on average raise the productivity of assisted firms by at least 2.5 percent. This productivity effect is at least twice the cost of the program.
Determining the jobs impact of manufacturing extension is a more difficult issue. On the one hand, helping firms to improve productivity may cost jobs, holding output constant. On the other hand, helping firms to be more competitive may expand output and jobs. The more careful analysis is done in a study by Ehlen (2001) . This study suggests that manufacturing extension, compared to business tax incentives, is about nine times more cost effective in creating jobs. 4 We currently devote about $7 million to manufacturing extension in Michigan. It would seem feasible to quadruple this effort without reducing the quality and productivity of assistance to manufacturers. This added $21 million in costs would be predicted to increase the present value of Michigan earnings by over 28 times as much, or $597 million. (28.45 = 3.14 × 9.06).
Idea 4: MEED Program
The MEED program was a subsidized employment and economic development program The MEED program has a number of components from other employment and economic development programs, but combined in a unique mix. The basic idea is to temporarily subsidize new job creation by both public and private employers for the long-term unemployed. The hope is that these temporary employment subsidies then increase long-run earnings in the state. These long-run earnings effects occur through two mechanisms. First, the subsidies to employers may induce employers to permanently add jobs to the state economy. Second, the temporary employment experience for the long-term unemployed may permanently raise their employability and productivity, which will boost their long-run earnings. Thus, the program simultaneously works on both the demand side and the supply side of the labor market.
The MEED program's wage subsidies were up to $10 per hour (in 2008 dollars) for six months of employment. Job slots had to pay the employer's prevailing wage for that type of job.
The MEED wage subsidies were generally about 80 percent of the total wages paid.
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The MEED program was a spending program run by local workforce agencies, not a tax credit. The local workforce agencies matched eligible workers with eligible employers, and had discretion in determining how to allocate wage subsidies to maximize the various goals of the program.
The eligible group whose hiring could trigger subsidies included any unemployed person who was not receiving unemployment benefits. However, the program was required to target individuals on some form of public assistance, and most of those assisted in Minnesota had formerly been on public assistance.
Eligible employers included both public and private employers. At the program's beginning in 1983, about 60 percent of the created jobs were in the public sector, mostly in small non-profits. However, in latter years over 75 percent of the job slots were in the private for-profit sector.
The subsidized jobs were required to be newly created jobs, not job vacancies. This requirement was imposed to reduce the displacement due to the program, from the disadvantaged taking jobs that would have been available anyway. For private sector job slots, employers were required to keep MEED workers for one year after the 6-month subsidy period. If this did not occur, private employers either had to repay up to 70 percent of the wage subsidy, or agree to hire another MEED worker.
The program gave preference to targeting small and medium sized businesses. Most of the businesses involved in the program were small and medium sized businesses. In addition, the program tried to target businesses that were "export-based" businesses, that is businesses that sold their goods and services to persons and businesses from outside of Minnesota.
It is important to note that even if the MEED program had zero demand-side employment effects (that is, all MEED subsidized jobs would have been created even without the program's help, or all subsidized jobs led to displacement of employment at other employers in the state), the MEED program could have considerable jobs impact if it raises the employability and skills levels of targeted workers. Increasing the employability and skills levels of disadvantaged workers will raise the effective labor supply of a state. State labor market models show that an increase in the quantity and quality of state labor supply will end up stimulating an expansion in the quantity and quality of labor demanded, which will increase state earnings.
Thus, a full analysis of the earnings effects of a MEED program must incorporate both demand side and supply side impacts. Demand side impacts are due to the MEED program creating jobs by either spending or subsidizing export-based expansion of private state employers. Supply side impacts are due to the MEED program increasing effective labor supply in a state by turning "unemployable" state residents into productive workers. increase the present value of state residents' earnings by $5.67. Of this $5.67, $2.67 is due to "demand-side" impacts (job creation in employers in both the short-run and long-run), and $2.98 is due to supply-side impacts (greater productivity of targeted workers).
At its height in Minnesota, the program was run on a scale that in today's dollars, and adjusted to Michigan's population, would be equivalent to a program costing $263 million per year. The estimated impact of one year of program funding would be to increase the present value of Michigan residents' earnings by $1.492 billion.
Four Ideas for Boosting the Productivity of Michigan's Labor Supply
I now consider four ideas that have proven effectiveness in boosting the employability and productivity of the labor supply of Michigan residents. Boosting the employability and productivity of Michigan residents will boost long-run employment and earnings of Michigan residents. State labor market and economic models show that a larger and more productive labor supply will attract additional employment from business location decisions, business expansions, and new businesses. As reviewed in Bartik (2001) , for every 100 additional productive workers, we can expect Michigan employment to expand by two-thirds as much.
Idea 5: Universal Pre-K High-quality universal pre-K and other early childhood programs have been shown in numerous studies to have significant long-run effects on educational attainment and adult employment rates and wage rates (Bartik 2006 (Bartik , 2008 . These long-run effects occur because, as
Nobel prize-winning economist James Heckman has said, "Skill begets skill and learning begets more learning. Early advantages cumulate; so do early disadvantages." (Cited at website of Pre-K Now.) High-quality early childhood programs increase both hard skills and soft skills of children entering kindergarten. This initial success leads to better behavior and better success in kindergarten. This initial school success then leads to more success in school, fewer assignments to special ed., and a lower probability of being held back a grade. The cumulative success changes the teacher's view of the student, the parent's view of the student, and the student's view of himself or herself. Some of the cognitive test score effects of pre-K and other early childhood programs tend to fade over time. However, the behavioral changes and the success in reaching life goals do not seem to diminish. Participants in high quality pre-K programs have higher high school graduation rates and college attendance. Furthermore, their increase in adult employment rates and wage rates are even greater than one would expect based only on their increases in educational attainment.
Based on these effects, I have estimated the long-run effects on state economic development of implementing high-quality universal pre-K for 4-year-olds (Bartik 2006 (Bartik , 2008 .
This program would be a half-day school-year program. Getting to universally accessible pre-K for all four-year-olds is assumed to require state funding for 70 percent of all four-year-olds. Research on mandatory summer school is largely based on Chicago's attempt to require that students below a certain achievement level go to summer school, and improve achievement to a certain level, or be retained in grade for the next year. Such a program provides strong incentives for students, parents, and teachers to improve academic performance during the summer session, to avoid student retention in grade. The program also provides incentives for students who are at risk of being required to go to summer school to reach higher achievement levels during the school year.
The Chicago research suggests that in such a program leads to students learning about two or three times more per week than these students typically learn during the school year.
Even a summer session of only six weeks can increase achievement levels by three months (Roderick, Jacob, and Bryk 2004) . In addition, meta-analysis of the effects of summer school suggest it can raise academic performance by an "effect size" of 0.2 or 0.3, which in early elementary grades can amount to two or three months of extra achievement in "grade level equivalents" (Cooper et al. 2000) .
There also is some research on the connection between early elementary test scores and later employment rates and wage rates (Currie and Thomas 1999 (Holzer and Lerman 2007) . The remaining 45 percent of job openings will require some post-secondary education but not a bachelor's degree. In other words, 4 out of 5 job openings will require some postsecondary education. But the majority of jobs requiring postsecondary education will require less than a bachelor's degree.
We need to figure out how to reform high schools and postsecondary options so as to provide high levels of skills for students that will lead to good careers. But these good careers need not in all cases involve a bachelor's degree.
The needed high school reforms may require some modification of Michigan's high school graduation requirements. The current high school graduation requirements are premised on the notion that all students should meet the requirements associated with successful entry into a college or university leading to a bachelor's degree.
What are good models for reforming high schools to prepare students for a broad range of postsecondary options and careers? One such model, with proven success, is the Career Academy model. The Career Academy model has been studied with an experimental methodology by MDRC (Kemple and Wilner 2008) . This experiment suggests that Career
Academies have high earnings benefits relative to costs.
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Career Academies typically serve between 150 and 200 students from grades 9 or 10 through 12th grade. Career Academies have three key features:
1) Each academy is designed as a small learning community in which teachers and students get to know each well, and teachers work as a team to help students.
2)
Career Academies have a curriculum that combines academic and career material around a career theme.
3) Career Academies establish partnerships with local employers to help make sure the curriculum is relevant, to increase career awareness among students, and to provide workbased learning opportunities.
The MDRC evaluation results show no effect, positive or negative, of Career Academies on postsecondary educational attainment. However, the Academies increased employment and earnings among students participating, compared to the randomly assigned control group, in follow-ups up to eight years after the scheduled high school graduation of the student.
The earnings effects of Career Academies are about $1,700 annually per student in years average effects on the treatment group compared to the control group. Presumably these average effects reflect higher effects for some students, and little or no effect for other students. The earnings effects are due to both higher wage rates and hours worked. Effects tend to be more positive for males than for females.
The cost of the Career Academy Program is about $2,200 per student (Belfield and Levin 2007) . This $2,200 is the total cost over the three years of the program, not an annual cost. The earnings effects after the program are therefore large compared to program costs. Furthermore, the time pattern of the earnings effects suggests that these earnings effects are not diminishing over time.
Suppose we assume that the Career Academy earnings effect persists for 25 years after high school graduation. I make further downward adjustments to adjust for some Career Academy graduates moving out of state or dying, and to adjust for any displacement effects of the program. were only $1,760 (Friedlander et al. 1997) . Furthermore, the earnings effects appear to persist for at least five years (GAO 1996) . Effects don't diminish much in years three or four after training was completed, and then tail off a bit in year five.
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Suppose we assume that the effects of government sponsored training programs on adults' earnings decline by 10 percent per year after the second year after training. I also make downwards adjustments for outmigration, mortality and labor market displacement. 14 The resulting calculation concludes that the ratio of the present value of earnings effects of training on state residents, to program costs, is 2.61. Some of the largest annual earnings effects are for programs with close ties to employers.
For example, there are sizable effects for such programs as apprenticeships, which obviously have extensive involvement with employers.
Summary of Results
Figure 3 summarizes the costs of one year of investment in each of these eight ideas. The figure also shows the resulting benefit of that one year of investment in an increased present value of earnings of state residents. Summed over these eight ideas, the total annual cost of this one year of investments is $873 million. The total effect on the present value of state residents' earnings is $5.5 billion.
These eight ideas certainly have a high benefit to cost ratio, exceeding 6 to 1.
On the other hand, an increase in the present value of state residents' earnings should be appropriately compared with today's annual earnings of Michigan residents. (That is, after all, the purpose of present value calculations.) These investments increase the present value of state residents' labor market earnings by an amount that is equivalent to only 2.3 percent of It takes very large returns even to get a 2.3 percent effect on earnings.
Furthermore, it should be noted that many of these initiatives could be scaled up considerably. I suspect the eight ideas mentioned above could eventually be increased by double their current size without much reduction in the benefit to cost ratio.
Finally, these are just eight ideas for which I happen to have some evidence for effectiveness. Presumably there may be other ideas that also offer similarly high returns.
Therefore, it may be feasible to figure out a set of investments that might boost Michigan per capita earnings by 5 percent or even 10 percent. But to reach this scale of effects requires somehow finding room to invest billions of dollars. It also requires identifying policy ideas with very high returns for state earnings per dollar invested.
Barriers to Investing
It seems to me that there are two primary barriers to Michigan making these sorts of investments. The first is Michigan's fiscal capacity. The second is Michigan's analytical capacity.
In terms of fiscal capacity, as is well known, Michigan's current policy budget shows a growing structural budget gap between current policy state revenues and current policy state expenditures. Based on research by the Citizens Research Council (CRC), in cooperation with the Upjohn Institute, even with a modestly growing state economy, the state of Michigan has a structural budget imbalance that will grow to about $10 billion per year in 2017 (CRC 2008) .
Unless Michigan can make reforms that will deal with this structural budget problem of $10 billion, it will be impossible to find the funds to make additional investments of $1 billion or $2 billion to boost state economic development. On the other hand, if the state can make reforms sufficient to close a $10 billion structural budget gap, some modest tweaks should be able to free up $1 or $2 billion for investments.
I believe the solutions to Michigan's structural budget problem are well-known among state policy analysts. To help revenues keep better pace with state income, tax reforms should broaden the sales tax to services, make the state income tax somewhat more progressive, and begin limiting the exemption of pension income from state income taxation. On the expenditure side, reforms need to begin cutting costs of the criminal justice system, and limiting the costs of increases in health benefit costs for current and retired public employees.
The issue is not a lack of knowledge about what is needed to deal with the structural budget deficit of the state of Michigan. The issue is whether the state has the political will and political institutions that will adopt such reforms, all of which are opposed by various groups.
The second barrier to making these types of investments is the state's analytical capacity for doing long-term policy analysis, and policymakers' willingness to listen to such analysis. The state needs to have the analytical capacity to look at a number of long-run policy issues, such as:
• What are the marginal taxes and costs facing various types of business location and expansion decisions, and how are these affected by state policy?
• What does the research literature say about the most effective investments to help businesses expand? What does the research literature say about the most effective investments to increase workers' skills?
• What does the research literature say about what policy reforms will be best at controlling criminal justice system costs and health costs, with the least adverse effects?
• Is a given state program effective, comparing those assisted by the program with similar non-participants? (This type of analysis can potentially be done for both programs seeking to help individual business expand and be more competitive, and for programs seeking to increase the skills of Michigan residents.)
There is no state agency or state-affiliated agency that has been given the budget and charge to be able to begin to answer such long-run policy questions. Furthermore, there is no sign that even if such an agency magically appeared from thin air, that state policymakers would pay much attention to its findings. There is a need for both greater analytical capacity and a change in political culture to value such analytical capacity.
One possible model for such a state agency is the Washington State Institute for Public
Policy. This agency was created by the state legislature and is funded by the legislature to do this type of long-term policy analysis. This policy analysis is based on both synthesizing results from previous research, and conducting original research. WSIPP uses both its own staff, and contracts out for consulting help or special expertise.
Perusing the studies done by WSIPP reveals an amazing array of highly policy-relevant analysis. For example, WSIPP has analyzed the benefits and costs of options for reducing corrections costs in Washington State (Aos et al. 2006) . These options include crime prevention programs as well as adult and juvenile offender programs. WSIPP considered over 70 possible programs to reduce corrections costs by reducing crime, and analyzed over 500 studies that used some sort of comparison group to evaluate these program approaches. They then identified which of these program options seemed to offer the greatest benefits to costs ratios, and presented the findings to the legislature. The findings led to specific decisions by the legislature to invest in proven programs that will lower the need for additional prison beds by lowering crime.
Conclusion
The approach adopted by this paper is not necessarily the usual approach to looking at economic development policy. To highlight how this approach differs from the usual approach, I mention some typical economic development policy issues that I do not consider in this paper, and why they were skipped. small and medium sized businesses in the auto sector, these businesses will be more successful, whether in the auto industry or in selling to more diverse customers. But it is not clear why we would want to focus such assistance solely on the auto sector. Nor should such assistance be provided with some pre-ordained government goal in mind.
It might be expected that an economic development paper presented at the University of Michigan might discuss the various efforts to leverage the research of the University of Michigan or other state universities into more Michigan-based spinoffs. I certainly have nothing against such efforts. However, I am unaware of rigorous research evidence that we know how to replicate the success of Silicon Valley. I do think we know that more mundane activities that may involve the higher education system, such as customized training programs and manufacturing extension services, do have proven success. One of the challenges in encouraging applied research spinoffs is whether most of the jobs will stick around, or whether they will quickly move elsewhere in the U.S. or the world. I don't know of any formula with demonstrated success to overcome this problem. But I emphasize that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. I'm not saying that efforts to encourage a large employment base due to applied research spinoffs cannot work. I'm merely saying I do not know of research showing that it does systematically work in a predictable way.
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It might be expected that an economic development analyst today would talk about attracting the creative class, as advocated by Richard Florida. I have nothing against such efforts either. But I don't know of any research on how the creative class can be predictably attracted in a cost-effective manner. In addition, I note that attracting the creative class only pays off for current Michigan residents to the extent to which educated outsiders provide external economic benefits for Michigan residents. In contrast, investing in greater skills of Michigan's current residents provides direct benefits for the Michigan residents who gain from such investments, as well as spillover benefits for others.
Thus, the approach in this paper is to focus on proven methods of lowering marginal business costs of expansion and raising Michigan residents' skills. I am less interested in speculative approaches that might work than in approaches that have good research evidence suggesting they will have large ratios of benefits to costs.
The successful approaches highlighted here suggest that providing businesses with information and training is often a relatively cheap way of encouraging business expansion.
Investing in residents' skills seems most effective if done either early in life or with close cooperation with employers.
These successes rest on some significant market failures in information and training markets. Private markets on their own do not always efficiently provide all needed information and skills.
Overcoming market failures is one of the keys to efficiently promoting state economic development goals. Such market failures are rarely confined to one industry. Therefore, focusing on market failures leads us away from economic development strategies that focus unduly on particular industries. It is not clear that public policy can effectively do industrial planning for a state's economy. Public policy has a sufficient challenge in providing information and training and education services that require government intervention, without taking on other planning tasks that may be beyond the public sector's comparative advantage.
But public policy can make a difference to state economic development. As this paper has shown, if Michigan makes significant economic development investments in high-return programs, over time it is possible to significantly boost the earnings of Michigan's residents. The question is whether we have the political will to make such investments.
NOTES
1 This is based on Ernst and Young's measurement of state and local business taxes in 2000 (Cline et al. 2004 ).
The Ernst and Young measure of state and local business taxes is divided by a measure of gross operating surplus of business, from the Regional Economic Information System, as a rough measure of business taxes as a percentage of profits.
2 This is based upon Peters and Fisher's measure of effective tax rates on a new manufacturing branch plant in 1998 (Peters and Fisher 2002, Table 3.3) . Their effective tax rates is based on the percentage reduction in the net present value of the cash flow of a new branch plant over a 20-year period due to state and local business taxes and economic development incentives.
3 That is, I use the consensus of the research literature on a −0.2 elasticity in how state and local business taxes affect business location decisions (Wasylenko 1997) . I also use a 12 percent real discount rate for business decisionmakers. I use a 3 percent real discount rate in discounting various benefits and costs from a public perspective. I use the research literature on how state and local employment growth affects employment rates and wage rates over time. All of these assumptions and procedures are outlined in more detail in Bartik (2008) . 4 The estimated cost per job created in today's dollars from the Ehlen study is $17,612 per job. The estimated cost per job created in today's dollars from business tax incentives is $159,582 (Bartik 2008) . The costeffectiveness of manufacturing extension is 9.06 times the cost-effectiveness of business tax incentives (9.06 = 159,582 / 17,612).
to formula grants. Therefore, the final effect upon state funding for pre-K is uncertain.
